

Message Text

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QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001

E.O. 11652: GDS
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SUBJ: POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN GREECE: 1975

1. IN A SURGE OF SUCCESSFUL, TOP-PRIORITY POLITICAL
INITIATIVES UNDER THE MASTERFUL LEADERSHIP OF PM CARAMANLIS
1974 DREW TO A DRAMATIC CLOSE
AFTER A STAGNANT INITIAL
SIX MONTHS WHICH SAW A STEADY DECLINE IN GOVERNMENT
INITIATIVES, EITHER TO DEAL WITH EXISTING PROBLEMS OR
TO CHART THE FUTURE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COURSE OF
GREECE, DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE STALEMATED
SITUATION IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN CYPRUS, COMPOUNDED
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BY PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' TOYING WITH LEFTIST AND COMMUNIST
FORCES ON THE ISLAND AND ACTIVELY SEEKING SOVIET SUPPORT,
SERVED TO ALARM THE JUNTA LEADERSHIP, MISLED BY THEIR OWN
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, SO THAT THEY DELUSED THEMSELVES INTO

BELIEVING THEY COULD MOVE THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS OFF DEAD CENTER AND INTO CIRCUMSTANCES MORE FAVORABLE TO GREEK INTERESTS. THEIR HOPE WAS THAT RE COURSE TO THE TIME-HONORED STRATAGEM OF AN EXTERNAL ISSUE WHICH, IF SUCCESSFULLY SOLVED, COULD RALLY POPULAR SUPPORT AND OVERCOME THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE REGIMES OTHERWISE OVERWHELMING RECORD OF FAILURE. INSTEAD IT BROUGHT DOWN THE SEVEN-YEAR HOUSE OF CARDS, PRODUCING A TOTAL DEBACLE--NEAR-WAR WITH TURKEY--AND EXPOSING THE INABILITY OF GREECE TO COME TO THE AID OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT PEOPLE. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THIS UNHAPPY RECORD WAS THE SUDDEN DECISION ON THE PART OF KEY MILITARY LEADERS, AS EVENTS MOVED TO THEIR CRITICAL CLIMAX IN JULY, TO CALL BACK RESPECTED POLITICAL PERSONALITIES OF THE PAST TO COPE WITH THE MORASS OF DIFFICULTIES IN WHICH GREECE WAS DROWNING.

2. IT IS AGAINST THIS DISMAL BACKGROUND THAT THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT MUST BE VIEWED AND PROJECTIONS MADE FOR THE YEAR AHEAD. SO FAR WE HAVE WITNESSED AN EVENLY PACED AND CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED UNFOLDING OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TOWARD FULL RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. PM CARAMANLIS NOW LOOKS AHEAD TO FINISHING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL TASKS. HE HAS SHOWN A STRONG SENSE OF PRIORITIES AND CLEARLY HAS A CHRONOLOGICAL ACTION PROGRAM IN MIND. HIS PRIORITY AGENDA HAS INCLUDED PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, REFERENDUM ON MONARCHY, CONSEQUENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, GREEK MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO, RENEGOTIATING STATUS OF U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES, AND ALSO CYPRUS, THE SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF WHICH CONTINUES TO BE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT ON AGENDA. IF CARAMANLIS FAILS TO ARRIVE AT A VIABLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH WILL BEGIN TO ERODE SIGNIFICANTLY.

3. WE CAN EXPECT THE REMAINING HURDLES IN RETURNING
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GREECE TO POLITICAL NORMALIZATION TO BE DEALT WITH WITHIN THE COMING SIX MONTHS--THE REVISION OF THE 1952 CONSTITUTION WHICH FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW MAY BE SUBMITTED FOR POPULAR REFERENDUM, THE SELECTION OF THE PERMANENT PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. THE REVISED CONSTITUTION NOW BEFORE PARLIAMENT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN UNIQUELY TAILED TO FULFILL GREEK REQUIREMENTS AND MEET WEAKNESSES AND DEFICIENCIES OF FORMER GREEK POLITICAL LIFE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER CARAMANLIS HIMSELF INTENDS TO SUBMIT HIS OWN CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS ALMOST A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. THE CHANGES ENVISAGED IN PARTY PRACTICES IN PARLIAMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CHANGES SHOULD ALSO IMPROVE THE PROSPECT FOR BETTER ORDERED POLITICAL ACTIVITY ACROSS THE BOARD. MUNICIPAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS WILL GENERATE SOME INTEREST IN LARGE CITIES BUT WILL BE FAIRLY CUT-AND-DRIED ELSEWHERE.

4. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON IMPORTANT NATIONAL ISSUES AND FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE STRICT PARTISAN LINES. TO A LARGE EXTENT, THE 1974 PARLIAMENT IS NOT IN THE MOLD OF PARLIAMENTS OF THE 1960'S SINCE DESPITE A NUMBER OF FORMER DEPUTIES REELECTED, NEARLY HALF ARE FIRST-TIMERS AND ALL SEEM CHARGED WITH AN INCREASED SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE AGAINST RISK OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. WE TEND TO BELIEVE THERE IS GOOD PROSPECT OF A MORE SOBER, PURPOSEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARLIAMENT IN THE FUTURE, BUT IT IS HARD TO BE CONFIDENT, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF INITIAL, HIGHLY PARTISAN REACTION TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

5. PARTY ALIGNMENTS MAY NOT SHIFT MEASURABLY BUT WITHIN POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS NEW LEADERS WILL SURFACE AS THE MEN OF THE CARAMANLIS, MAVROS, AND ILIOU GENERATION BEGIN TO DISAPPEAR FROM THE GREEK POLITICAL SCENE.

6. ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S PASOK REPRESENTS THE ONLY CLEAR ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES, BUT HIS ERRATIC PERFORMANCE THUS FAR, WITH ONLY LIMITED AND GRUDGING SUPPORT FROM ELEVEN CONFIDENTIAL

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OTHER PASOK DEPUTIES, REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DRAMATIC, EARLY SHIFT IN GREEK POLITICAL ORIENTATION. PAPANDREOU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO SHARPEN FOCUS ON PUBLIC ISSUES BY EMPHASITICALLY DELINEATING THE APPEAL OF NEW POLICIES AND PROGRAMS REVERSING GREEK POLITICAL TRADITIONS AND IN CONSEQUENCE ATTRACTING YOUTHFUL SUPPORTERS WHO FIND HIS SOCIALIST-NEUTRALIST "WAVE-OF-THE-FUTURE" PHILOSOPHY SEDUCTIVE. NEVER-THELESS WE BELIEVE HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO HAVE REAL PROBLEMS IN ATTRACTING ADHERENTS, GIVEN HIS MERCURIAL POLICIES AND HIS EXPOSURE TO THE NECESSITY OF CONVINCING OTHERS THAT HE HAS A VIABLE PROGRAM, WHETHER VIEWED IN EXCLUSIVELY GREEK TERMS OR TAKING BROADER INTERNATIONAL HORIZONS INTO ACCOUNT. AT THE SAME TIME PAPANDREOU HAS POURED WATER IN HIS WINE AS GREEK REMARK, AND HE COULD IMPROVE PASOK'S POSITION RELATIVE TO ANTICIPATED FRACTIONALIZATION IN TRADITIONAL PARTIES WHICH MAY REEMERGE IN COMING MONTHS.

7. MAVROS' LEADERSHIP OF CU/NF IS UNDER CHALLENGE BY NEW FORCE DEPUTIES WHO DESCRIBE HIM AS "OVER THE

HILL".

8. IF CARAMANLIS SHOULD CHOOSE TO BECOME PRESIDENT AND ND IS FACED WITH PROSPECT OF CHOOSING BETWEEN ND STALWARTS GEORGE RALLIS AND EVANGELOS AVEROFF FOR PRIME MINISTER, PARTY WOULD PROBABLY BE FURTHER DIVIDED. FIRST SYMPTOMS OF POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN ND UNITY CAME AFTER REFERENDUM WHEN SMALL NUMBER OF RAYALIST DEPUTIES BROKE PARTY RANKS IN VOTING AGAINST THE ND CANDIDATE FOR PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT WHILE SEVERAL OTHERS ONLY RELUCTANTLY FELL IN LINE AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR.

9. IN ANY EVENT, MAIN POINT IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES ARE RESHAPING, WITH MEN WHO HAVE GUIDED NATIONAL PUBLIC LIFE SINCE EARLY 50'S GRADUALLY BEING SUCCEDED BY YOUNGER LEADERS WHOSE QUALITIES AND CAPACITY FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REMAIN UNTESTED. CARAMANLIS HIMSELF HAS CONSCIOUSLY PUT YOUNGER MEN
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IN AS SECRETARIES GENERAL AND CLEARLY LOOKS FORWARD TO A "NEW DAY" IN GREEK POLITICAL LIFE BASED ON REGENERATIVE EFFECT OF NEW BLOOD. MUCH WILL DEPEND UPON EXTENT TO WHICH REVISED CONSTITUTION AND NOW ENVISAGED PARLIAMENTARY REFORMS CAN CREATE AND ENCOURAGE PRACTICE OF CONSTRUCTIVE OPPOSITION, HITHERTO ALMOST UNKNOWN IN GREEK POLITICAL VORTEX.

10. THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT IS SEARCHING FOR A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO WHICH PRESERVES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE BENEFITS OF FULL MEMBERSHIP WHILE VISIBLY SEPARATING GREECE FROM THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. THE DIALOGUE WITH NATO WILL NOT BE RUSHED BY THE GOG, WHICH STILL BELIEVES THAT ITS IMPLIED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MILITARY REINTEGRATION IN NATO WILL LEAD THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR NATO COUNTRIES TO MODIFY THEIR POLICIES ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE IN GREECE'S FAVOR. ALTHOUGH AN ATTENUATED GREECE/NATO RELATIONSHIP IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO RESULT, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE GOG WILL WISH TO KEEP NAMFI ACTIVE AND COMPLETE NAWTC. THE PROSPECTS FOR RETURN

TO PRE-JULY 1974 STATUS OF NICS AND NADGE ARE LESS SURE SINCE THEY DEPEND UPON IMPROVEMENTS IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP.

11. A RESTRUCTURED SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL EMERGE FROM GREEK-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS LIKELY TO START EARLY IN 1975. THIS WILL PROBABLY INITIALLY TAKE THE FORM OF A HIGHLY VISIBLE DECISION TO

REDUCE THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF THE U.S. MILITARY
PRESENCE, WITH IMPLEMENTATION TO FOLLOW ON A
REASONABLE TIMETABLE. SUBSEQUENTLY, NEGOTIATIONS ON
DETAILS OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE MARKED BY
GOG EFFORTS TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER OPERATIONAL
ACTIVITIES OF U.S. FORCES, TO ELIMINATE ANY FINANCIAL
BURDEN FOR GOG FROM U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, AND TO
REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE PRIVILEGES HERETOFORE ENJOYED
BY U.S. PERSONNEL, ALL DESIGNED TO CONVINCE GREEK
PUBLIC THAT GOG IS IMPLEMENTING ITS DECISION TO
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"RECOVER...FULL EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY" OVER
GREEK TERRITORY, AIRSPACE, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS.
AS WITH NATO DIALOGUE, GOG CAN BE EXPECTED TO USE
WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS U.S. APPREHENSION OVER POSSIBLE
LOSS OF FACILITIES TO INFLUENCE U.S. POLICY ON CYPRUS
ISSUE. THE SAME GOG PERCEPTION WILL CONTINUE TO MARK
GREEK EFFORTS TO EXTRACT FROM USG THE WHREWITHAL
NEEDED RAPIDLY TO MODERNIZE GREECE'S INVENTORY OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT, PERHAPS TAKING THE FORM OF A
DIRECT QUID FOR THE QUO OF CONTINUED, IF REDUCED,
U.S. BASE RIGHTS.

12. MAJOR DOMESTIC ISSUE CONFRONTING CARAMANLIS'
ADMINISTRATION REMAINS RECONCILIATION OF ARMED FORCES
AND PUBLIC. GOG THROUGH SELECTIVE PROCESS OF
INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF CHIEF CULPRITS WITH
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL LIABILITY HAS LAUNCHED LEGAL CASE
AGAINST THOSE INVOLVED IN APRIL 21, 1967 COUP D'ETAT
AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN POWER AT TIME OF POLYTECHNION
STUDENT RIOTS IN NOVEMBER, 1973. CARAMANLIS IN EFFORTS
TO REBUILD COHESIVE AND DISCIPLINED ARMED FORCES WILL
SEEK TO IMPOSE MEASURES AND PUNISHMENTS AS ADJUDICATED
IN MANNER LEAST DISRUPTIVE TO MORALE OF MILITARY
WHILE AT SAME TIME TAMING DOWN LIBERAL/LEFTIST
DEMAND FOR FULL "DEJUNTIZATION" IN ALL ASPECTS OF
PUBLIC LIFE.

13. RECTIFYING THE DISAFFECTION OF YOUTH/STUDENTS
THROUGH MILITARY YEARS WILL ALSO REQUIRE PRIORITY
ATTENTION, AND THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT
CARAMANLIS CAN EXPECT TO DRAW SUPPORT FROM THIS
QUARTER. STUDENT ACTIVISTS TEND TO REGARD CARAMANLIS
AND HIS ASSOCIATES AS TOO CONSERVATIVE TO MEET THE
NEED OF GREEK SOCIETY FOR RESTRUCTURING. IN THE
MANNER OF STUDENTS EVERYWHERE THEY ARE CASTING ABOUT
FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
POLICY AND BELIEVE, SIMPLISTICALLY, THAT ONLY NEW
LEADERS CAN POINT THE WAY. ACADEMIC REFORM IS LONG
OVERDUE, AND WHILE GOG'S IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNOUNCED
MAJOR EDUCATION CHANGES WILL HELP, THE PROCESS OF

HEALING BREACH BETWEEN YOUTH AND NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
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WILL REQUIRE TIME. MORAL LEADERSHIP, AN ELUSIVE PHENOMENON, GIVEN THE POLITICS OF FAVORITISM, NEPOTISM AND CRONYISM PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERISTIC IN THIS COUNTRY, WILL HAVE TO BE PROVEN IF STUDENT AND YOUTH SUPPORT IS TO BE ACHIEVED AND THE FORCES OF RADICALISM, WHETHER HEADED BY PAPANDREOU OR OTHERS EVEN FURTHER TO THE LEFT, HELD IN CHECK.

14. IN REBUILDING NATION'S REINVIGORATION OF THE PUBLIC LIFE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IS A MATTER OF INCREASINGLY HIGH PRIORITY. NEW APPOINTMENTS TO MAJOR LABOR FEDERATIONS (PENDING ELECTIONS) AND TO KEY GOVERNMENT POSITIONS HAVE NOT WON LABOR'S CONFIDENCE, AND LABOR MINISTER CONSTANTINE LASKARIS WITH EUROPEAN SOCIALIST ORIENTATION DRAWS MORE SUSPICION THAN SUPPORT, AT LEAST WITH THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP. GREEK LABOR'S REESTABLISHMENT OF TIES WITH INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENTS HAS ALSO BEEN LAUNCHED ON UNCERTAIN BASIS, BUT THIS IS NOTHING NEW SINCE GREEK TRADE UNIONISM HAS NEVER ACHIEVED REAL STATUS. PM CARAMANLIS WILL NEED TO DEAL DIRECTLY AND DECISIVELY WITH LABOR PROBLEMS THAT, ESPECIALLY AS THEY ARE COMPOUNDED BY ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, CANNOT BE PUT ON ICE.

15. IN FOREIGN POLICY CARAMANLIS' MOST BURDENOME LEGACY IS PROBLEM OF CYPRUS WHICH WAS EXACERBATED BY SECOND TURKISH INVASION ONLY THREE WEEKS AFTER HE ASSUMED POWER. REBUILDING POSITIVE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS WHICH PM HAS IDENTIFIED AS CRUCIAL OBJECTIVE TO ENSURE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WILL MEAN SALVAGING GREEK INTERESTS IN CYPRUS THROUGH SKILLFUL MANAGEMENT DESIGNED TO MEET LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF GREEK CYPRIOTS BUT BALANCE EXTERMIST AND UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS OF MAKARIOS, AS WELL AS RECOGNIZING BY SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS REALITIES OF STRENGTHENED TURKISH POSITION ON ISLAND AFTER LAST SUMMER'S DEBACLE. GOG ATTITUDE IN RECENT WEEKS CONFIRMS SINCERITY AND DETERMINATION OF CARAMANLIS IN SEEKING WORKABLE SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM. AS A PRAGMATIST HE MAY NOT EXPECT A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT TO ADVANCE MEASURABLY HIS OWN POLITICAL POSITION, BUT AT

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SAME TIME HE WILL NOT ACCEPT SOLUTION DETRIMENTAL TO NATIONAL INTERESTS OR WHICH COULD UNDERMINE GREECE'S FUTURE FEEDOM TO PURSUE ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AEGEAN AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN EXPLOTING ITS PUTATIVE

OIL RESOURCES.

16. WE ANTICIPATE U.S./GREEK RELATIONS WILL PASS THROUGH A DIFFICULT TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN THE COMING YEAR. AS WE TACKLE JOB OF PUTTING OUR MILITARY COOPERATION ON A NEW FOOTING AND SEEK A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT THAT WILL REDUCE THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF GREEK-TURKISH ANTAGONISM IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. WITH INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT THESE PROBLEMS ARE SOLUBLE AND THE LONGER-RANGE PROSPECTS FOR CLOSE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL U.S. GREEK RELATIONS ARE FAVORABLE.

17. SEPARATE CABLE COVERS ECONOMIC PROSPECTS. KUBISCH UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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